<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <rss version="2.0" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:wfw="http://wellformedweb.org/CommentAPI/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/" xmlns:slash="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/slash/" ><channel><title>ipHouse Blog &#187; Online Security</title> <atom:link href="http://blogs.iphouse.net/category/online-security/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" /><link>http://blogs.iphouse.net</link> <description>A friendly, local ISP with a view.</description> <lastBuildDate>Sat, 04 Feb 2012 04:14:51 +0000</lastBuildDate> <language>en</language> <sy:updatePeriod>hourly</sy:updatePeriod> <sy:updateFrequency>1</sy:updateFrequency> <generator>http://wordpress.org/?v=3.3.1</generator> <item><title>What is a WiFi Controller?</title><link>http://blogs.iphouse.net/2012/01/25/what-is-a-wifi-controller/</link> <comments>http://blogs.iphouse.net/2012/01/25/what-is-a-wifi-controller/#comments</comments> <pubDate>Wed, 25 Jan 2012 20:15:06 +0000</pubDate> <dc:creator>Doug McIntyre</dc:creator> <category><![CDATA[Online Security]]></category> <category><![CDATA[networking]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Security]]></category> <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category><guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.iphouse.net/?p=2115</guid> <description><![CDATA[WiFi controller solutions have become pretty popular for Enterprises lately. Some of the benefits of why you would want them are. Centralized management over several to many access-points. Unified access policies. Ease of deployment. Rogue AP scanning for PCI/DSS compliance. Once an enterprise needs more than one or two access-points for providing WiFi services internally the management <a href="http://blogs.iphouse.net/2012/01/25/what-is-a-wifi-controller/" class="more-link">More &#62;</a>]]></description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>WiFi controller solutions have become pretty popular for Enterprises lately. Some of the benefits of why you would want them are.</p><ul><li>Centralized management over several to many access-points.</li><li>Unified access policies.</li><li>Ease of deployment.</li><li>Rogue <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wireless_access_point" target="_blank">AP</a> scanning for <a href="https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/security_standards/" target="_blank">PCI/DSS</a> compliance.</li></ul><div><p><span id="more-2115"></span></p><p>Once an enterprise needs more than one or two access-points for providing <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wifi" target="_blank">WiFi</a> services internally the management of them can become an issue. Where is that AP? What IP address range does it have? What is going on with that one?</p><p>With more smart services on Smartphones, especially with regards to <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voip" target="_blank">VoIP</a>, not having to renegotiate crypto stack and keys when you transition from coverage area to coverage area will greatly improve the user experience. Imagine walking down the hall talking on <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google_voice" target="_blank">Google Voice</a>, and your call cuts out for 4-5 seconds as the smartphone crosses the threshold from one AP to the next. No one wants to put up with that.</p></div><div><p>There are two kinds of WiFi access type devices.</p><p>The first is an access-point. This is a pure bridge from an ethernet network on the airwaves. It provides no added services, no DHCP, no routing, no NAT. (although I just touched an AP that said it did DHCP, it was buggy with this regard and wouldn&#8217;t let me configure it anyway).</p><p>The Access Point still negotiates encryption between the client and the access-point with WPA (or WEP) though, and each time the client connects to the next access-point they will go through this negotiation again.</p><p>Access Points are not very common. Much more common types of WiFi access device is a router combined with an access-point. This device will do NAT (on its own session table timeouts), maybe supporting things like UPnP or NAT-PMP. Either way, in an enterprise, you are going to end up doing double NAT, and the client won&#8217;t be directly reachable by others on different access-point routers, but will be directly reachable on the same access-point.</p><p>Going from access-point router to access-point router is an even heavier operation as now the client, as well as having to negotiate encryption again, also has to get a new IP address and will drop all TCP sessions going on (ie. your VoIP call control channel) as it enters the new access-point radio zone.</p><p>With a WiFi controller you end up with one central controller that handles all encryption negotiation and handles all networking with only one central policy.</p><p>The WiFi LWAPs (light-weight access points) now become much dumber boxes essentially taking all WiFi traffic and tunnelling it back to the WiFi controller on your LAN.</p><p>Then the radios in the LWAP basically are just part of one global area. You no longer have different encryption zones moving from radio to radio your client device just uses the closest radio it can get a lock on.</p><p>The networking policies also don&#8217;t change from radio zone to radio zone. Since everything is tunnelled, it all appears at the controller end-point and that point is where everything starts routing.</p><p>I&#8217;m most familure with Fortinet&#8217;s <a title="WAP/WiFi solution" href="http://www.fortinet.com/products/fortiap/index.html">WAP/WiFi solution</a>, although there are many vendors with this solution. Ie. <a title="Cisco" href="http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps6302/Products_Sub_Category_Home.html">Cisco</a>, <a title="Juniper" href="http://www.juniper.net/us/en/products-services/wireless/wlc-series/">Juniper</a>, <a title="Xirus" href="http://www.xirrus.com/Products/Core-Technology.aspx">Xirrus</a>, <a title="Meraki" href="http://meraki.com/products/wireless/">Meraki</a>, <a title="Aerohive" href="http://www.aerohive.com/">Aerohive</a>.</p><p>With the Fortinet solution the WiFi Controller software is built into their line of Firewalls (Fortigate) and can be easily enabled making it two clicks to be up and running.</p><p>Hooking up a new LWAP is almost turnkey. The current models from Fortinet all use power-over-ethernet (PoE). You plug in your device to your PoE switch, it comes online using DHCP and broadcasts out for the controller. All traffic over the WiFi becomes tunneled. It is not allowed on the main network you plug your LWAPs into.</p><p>Inside the Fortigate you will see your new LWAP, authorize it to become part of your network, and it updates itself for the radio parameters you&#8217;ve already setup. Adding a new LWAP to the setup can be up and running in less than 30 seconds and provides more coverage immediately.</p><p>Since this is integrated into Fortinet&#8217;s Firewall solution the new SSID realm you setup becomes a new Interface on your firewall. You can run a DHCP server on that interface, setup policies to allow that realm access to what you need, add NAT translation on your policies, and you&#8217;ll be set.</p><p>Now, the LWAPs form one area seemlessly serving the client, and the client attaches to the radio with the strongest signal.</p><p>Since complying with PCI/DSS requirements for the major credit card clearning houses requires orginizations to not have direct WiFi access bridged on a network that handle credit card data, and to scan for rogue APs that an employee may bring into work with them and compromise network security; some WiFi controller solutions have options to scan for rogue APs.</p><p>The PCI/DSS requires companies to specificly scan for rogue APs on some general time frame (it doesn&#8217;t actually say how often, but at least quarterly is generally accepted as what it entails).</p><p>The Fortigate solution has this sort of scanning built-in, and allows it to see if there is an AP that is also on the wire for the LAN side. Fortigate also can take this to one step higher by sending disassociate messages spoofing as client so that the rogue AP drops the connections to the rogue AP, protecting the network from control beyond what the network administrator knows about.</p><p>I&#8217;ve been pretty excited to see these sorts of setups deployed, although many non-networking type people don&#8217;t understand why double-NAT is bad, or what the deal is with renegotiating crypto and DHCP for each radio zone, they appreciate it much more without understanding the underlying benefits this sort of setup brings.</p><p>&nbsp;</p></div> ]]></content:encoded> <wfw:commentRss>http://blogs.iphouse.net/2012/01/25/what-is-a-wifi-controller/feed/</wfw:commentRss> <slash:comments>0</slash:comments> </item> <item><title>Debugging IPSec VPNs in FortiGate</title><link>http://blogs.iphouse.net/2012/01/20/debugging-ipsec-vpns-in-fortigate/</link> <comments>http://blogs.iphouse.net/2012/01/20/debugging-ipsec-vpns-in-fortigate/#comments</comments> <pubDate>Fri, 20 Jan 2012 23:09:55 +0000</pubDate> <dc:creator>Doug McIntyre</dc:creator> <category><![CDATA[ipHouse Products]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Online Security]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Support]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Security]]></category> <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category> <category><![CDATA[vmForge]]></category> <category><![CDATA[VPN]]></category><guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.iphouse.net/?p=2211</guid> <description><![CDATA[Debugging IPSec VPNs in FortiGate Debugging what is going wrong with a VPN setup is difficult. The IKE protocol is &#8220;chatty&#8221;, and negotiates back and forth between the two ends for several rounds. The GUI offers not much help, it is either  UP or Down. Most of the real debugging happens inside the CLI. One <a href="http://blogs.iphouse.net/2012/01/20/debugging-ipsec-vpns-in-fortigate/" class="more-link">More &#62;</a>]]></description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong><span style="font-size: large;">Debugging IPSec VPNs in FortiGate</span></strong></p><p>Debugging what is going wrong with a VPN setup is difficult. The IKE protocol is &#8220;chatty&#8221;, and negotiates back and forth between the two ends for several rounds. The GUI offers not much help, it is either  UP or Down. Most of the real debugging happens inside the CLI.</p><p>One problem in particular that has always bugged me is that you need access to the end machines involved to initiate traffic across the link. The network admin typically doesn&#8217;t have direct access on the computers on either side of the VPN in order to initiate that traffic. I&#8217;ll show you a method that can be used to initiate traffic from that network as well.<br /> <span id="more-2211"></span><br /> Here are some basic steps to troubleshoot VPNs for FortiGate.</p><p>In IKE/IPSec, there are two phases to establish the tunnel. Phase1 is the basic setup and getting the two ends talking. Then IKE takes  over in Phase2 to negotiate the shared key with periodic key rotation as well as dealing with NAT-T (NAT tunnelling), and all the other &#8220;higher-end&#8221; parameters.</p><p>The first trouble shooting step is to verify your parameters are all correct and matching.</p><p>For Phase1, is the end gateway dynamic or static? Fortigate to Fortigate can use both Main and Aggressive modes for dynamic connections, but many other brands can not. In general, if you are supporting a dynamic IP client end, you will have to use Aggressive mode Phase1, so make sure that mode is set for dynamic clients. If this a static config, you should use Main mode for Phase1, which is a bit more secure on the initial handshake.</p><p>For Phase2, are both sides setup to use PFS? Replay Detection? Dead-peer detection? While most VPN setups include a set of encryption and hash algorithms, you only need one that are the same. The reason for the set is to offer many choices. In practice, just pick one that your base client supports and go from there. Now-a-days, AES256/SHA1 is probably supported across the board, and that is all I ever use. You don&#8217;t have to match the set of them exactly, each side just needs a common one to talk.</p><p>After that all checks out, we need to see what IKE is doing that is failing.</p><p>So SSH or console into the CLI.</p><p>If this is debugging a VDOM<br /> (like in this case), you may have to switch into the root VDOM if you<br /> are the system admin of the firewall as opposed to a VDOM admin.</p><pre>fgt300C-fw # config vdom
fgt300C-fw # edit root
current vf=root:0

fgt300C-fw (root) #</pre><p>as the diag commands are only available in the individual VDOMs or from the root VDOM for the system admin.</p><p>To enable debug logging on the console (should be default) do</p><pre>fgt300C-fw (root) # diagnose debug console</pre><p>To enable debugging output</p><pre>fgt300C-fw (root) # diagnose debug enable</pre><p>Phase1 debugging isn&#8217;t too useful. IKE/Phase2 debugging is where the problem almost always is. Lets turn on full debugging logs there.</p><pre>fgt300C-fw (root) # diagnose debug application ike -1</pre><p>Now, the problem I&#8217;ve always run up against is getting the tunnel to trigger to open up with traffic running on the link. You either have to conference in somebody with access to help you, or use this nifty trick&#8230;</p><p>Open another SSH connection to the FW CLI.  (If this is a VDOM, you&#8217;ll have to &#8216;conf vdom; edit &#8220;vdom3&#8243; to get into<br /> the VDOM context where the network is you want to troubleshoot).</p><p>Set the ping source IP address to be in the inside network of the host you are trying to troubleshoot..</p><pre>fgt300C-fw (vdom3) # execute ping-options source 172.30.3.254</pre><p>And now, ping away from the CLI in order to bring up the tunnel interface</p><pre>fgt300C-fw (vdom3) # execute ping 192.168.0.1</pre><p>(assuming 192.168.0.1 is an existing host only reachable via the VPN tunnel, and the ping service is allowed through the tunnel).</p><pre>fgt300C-fw (vdom3) # execute ping 192.168.0.1
PING 192.168.0.1 (192.168.0.1): 56 data bytes
64 bytes from 192.168.0.1: icmp_seq=0 ttl=64 time=46.9 ms
64 bytes from 192.168.0.1: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=47.3 ms
64 bytes from 192.168.0.1: icmp_seq=2 ttl=64 time=45.5 ms
64 bytes from 192.168.0.1: icmp_seq=3 ttl=64 time=66.3 ms
64 bytes from 192.168.0.1: icmp_seq=4 ttl=64 time=45.7 ms

--- 192.168.0.1 ping statistics ---
5 packets transmitted, 5 packets received, 0% packet loss
round-trip min/avg/max = 45.5/50.3/66.3 ms</pre><p>The trick here is that you are source as the network you are setting up, which should trigger the tunnel to come up if it isn&#8217;t up already, and you can see real live traffic. I don&#8217;t know how many times I&#8217;ve been stuck on a conference call waiting for whoever had access to do something to get around to doing the test I asked of them.</p><p>Back in the first debug window, you should see a whole bunch of IPSec and IKE messages fly past on the screen.</p><p>You have to learn to pick out the lines that are important, and zone in on them as everything is flying by. Learn to pause the display (or do a quick &#8216;diag debug dis&#8217; to stop the output). Scrolling back and zeroing in on the one error out of 100 lines is going to be your key skill here.</p><p>If all is well, you should get something about the SA being established with the SPI value (not important).</p><pre>ike 3:MyVPN_GW:18690:MyVPN:49143: added IPsec SA: SPIs=939fc892/b54d030</pre><p>and of course, if it is configured for SNMP, something like</p><pre>ike 3:MyVPN_GW:18690:MyVPN:49143: sending SNMP tunnel UP trap</pre><p>is a nice confirmation that all is well with the VPN.</p><p>If you are seeing a lot of errors repeating with Phase1, and you see messages like</p><pre>ike 3:MyVPN_GW:18698: sent IKE msg (P1_RETRANSMIT): ....</pre><p>Most likely the problem is a mismatch preshare key for the VPN tunnel, as it isn&#8217;t passing out of P1 (which doesn&#8217;t have much to negotiate).</p><p>Also check again if this is dynamic client (generally requiring Aggressive mode) or a static connection that probably should be set to Main mode, but could be using Aggressive Mode.</p><p>If you don&#8217;t have a common encryption alg/hash, you should see some errors like..</p><pre>ike 3:MyVPN_GW:18707: no SA proposal chosen</pre><p>As it can&#8217;t find a matching SA between the two ends using the same encryption algorithm/hash combo to encrypt the tunnel. Fixup the encryption alg/hash and everything should go better.</p><p>The hardest problems to detect are different keylength timers (you&#8217;ll just have to review them on both sides to make sure your P1 and P2 keylife timers are identical on both sides). Problems that you encounter with different timers show up as a VPN that works for a while, but then stops work, and won&#8217;t come up unless you bounce both sides. With valid timers the same on both sides, the VPN should keep up and key rollovers happen automatically.</p><p>Also, DPD may not always negotiate. One side may have it on and let a VPN connection stay up for a certain time until the timer kicks off and closes the connection for the lack of keep-alive packets. Make sure both sides have it on, or both sides have it off.</p><p>There are a few other error conditions that may come up, but these are the more common errors.</p><p>The most important thing with the low level debugging like this is to learn to pick out the important error lines from all the rest of the junk flying by. It just takes practice. You may want to deliberately break an existing setup just to see what happens. But once you can zero in on that one error line out of a 100 that is important, it will be a lot easier to troubleshoot what problems may come at you.</p> ]]></content:encoded> <wfw:commentRss>http://blogs.iphouse.net/2012/01/20/debugging-ipsec-vpns-in-fortigate/feed/</wfw:commentRss> <slash:comments>0</slash:comments> </item> <item><title>NAT: the savior and destroyer of the Internet</title><link>http://blogs.iphouse.net/2012/01/03/nat-the-savior-and-destroyer-of-the-internet/</link> <comments>http://blogs.iphouse.net/2012/01/03/nat-the-savior-and-destroyer-of-the-internet/#comments</comments> <pubDate>Tue, 03 Jan 2012 20:23:48 +0000</pubDate> <dc:creator>Doug McIntyre</dc:creator> <category><![CDATA[Online Security]]></category> <category><![CDATA[System Administrators]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Connectivity]]></category> <category><![CDATA[IPv6]]></category> <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category> <category><![CDATA[VPN]]></category><guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.iphouse.net/?p=1756</guid> <description><![CDATA[Having helped a customer setup VPNs for private connectivity to several large (ie. Fortune 100) companies lately, I&#8217;ve really dreaded seeing how NAT has been abused to the extent that it is making private islands on the Internet and breaking everything from routing to DNS to any future protocol enhancements. First some history. Back in <a href="http://blogs.iphouse.net/2012/01/03/nat-the-savior-and-destroyer-of-the-internet/" class="more-link">More &#62;</a>]]></description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Having helped a customer setup VPNs for private connectivity to several large (ie. Fortune 100) companies lately, I&#8217;ve really dreaded seeing how NAT has been abused to the extent that it is making private islands on the Internet and breaking everything from routing to DNS to any future protocol enhancements. <span id="more-1756"></span><strong>First some history</strong>.</p><p>Back in the day when we started out routing networks for customers, generally the practice was to route a whole Class C (or /24 now-a-days, this was before <a title="CIDR" href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1519">CIDR</a>  was widely deployed as well), or maybe 2 or 4 depending on how many IP addresses that customer, or larger department needed. Large companies didn&#8217;t have connected networks, each workgroup or department was usually separate, or if they were really big, we&#8217;d help get them a Class B network with the Internic.</p><p>There wasn&#8217;t the prevelant use of firewalls, these connections were directly on, or if there was a firewall, it was a proxy type, with the stations having the ports blocked and needing to proxy out for things like FTP or HTTP if that was even a consideration. It was pretty apparent even than that having a total of about 2 million Class C&#8217;s available wasn&#8217;t going to be able to service a lot of customers with these types connections. Especially when you look now-a-days and see a large ISP like Comcast easily having 2 million subscribers in one larger metro area. So, out came CIDR which saved us from handing out /24s in every case and it certainly cut down on handing out IP addresses wastefully.</p><p>It took a while for people to get the concept of CIDR and even longer for gear to fully support it properly but it helped.</p><p>In the meantime NAT was created.</p><p>At first it was more one-to-one translation so that if some workstations were in an unfortunate range they could be translated to another range of IP addresses that worked better. Then <a title="Port Address Translation" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Port_address_translation" target="_blank">PAT</a> (aka <a title="Network Address, Port Translation" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_Address_and_Port_Translation" target="_blank">NAPT</a>) came about that actually let us hide a range of machines behind one IP address on the outside. This was starting to look a lot more like what the current crop of residential routers allows today; hide a whole range of networks behind one public IP address so that we can go back to the model of having one IP address per customer. Finally what allowed that was modifying existing protocols that broke with NAT to be more NAPT friendly, recognizing that something can still be in the middle. IPSec got <a title="NAT Traversal" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NAT-T" target="_blank">NAT-T</a> transport, and enterprise class firewalls got things like <a title="Application Level Gateway" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Application-level_gateway" target="_blank">ALG</a> which allowed more deeper inspection into protocols to help things along like FTP, SIP, and H.323 which do weird things embedding raw IP addresses inside the protocol itself rather than just the headers.</p><p>The only reason the Internet could grow at the rate it did was that NAT saved the ISPs from having to deploy huge tracts of IP addressing that wasn&#8217;t going to be used (do you have 256 devices connected up in your home network? Multiple your home by millions of others in your metro area). Now that we have exhausted IPv4 it seems like they should have done more, but really at the time, nobody envisioned 78% (240 million) of the US population to be connected on the Internet, let alone the adaption rates around the globe.</p><p><strong>What is broken now.</strong></p><p><strong></strong>When I was working with these large enterprise companies they had deployed NAT to all their borders.</p><p>They&#8217;ve totally isolated themselves off from the world, anything going out and going in has to be NAT thus when we needed to get into their networks with the VPN tunnels it produced all sorts of interesting problems that never ever was imagined way back when the Internet was first launching.</p><p>Since NAT was required talking even back to us over the VPN tunnel, we determined that things like terminal server (TS) gateway which our customer was trying to deploy would be failing because of the NAT requirements. I don&#8217;t know of any firewall that has an ALG for TS gateway but even if there was one, it most likely wouldn&#8217;t have been deployed by these large dinosaur of an enterprise company in their IT department.</p><p>Thankfully we weren&#8217;t doing any <a title="Voice over Internet Protocol" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VoIP" target="_blank">VoIP</a> connections for these people but those would have broken too, as SIP and H.323 and <a title="Multigateway Control Protocol" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MGCP" target="_blank">MGCP</a> all require ALGs on the firewall level to deal with NAT. Since we were hidden behind NAT things would have broken pretty hard getting these types of packets back to them.</p><p>Finally, since they NAT everything in and out, any and all external DNS are broken too, so they have to take over DNS deployments for our customers machines, further isolating them off from the rest of the Internet. Normal DNS entries and domains don&#8217;t work in the large IT enterprise enviornment, custom DNS has be requesitioned, setup, tested and deployed at each site, negating any benefit for a single authoritative source (which when DNSSec takes off, will be promptly ignored because it won&#8217;t be used).</p><p><strong>The future.</strong></p><p><strong></strong>Since the widespread rollout of IPv6 recently it has been so nice to get back to the roots of the concepts of unique IP addressing for end-to-end communication. Unfortunatly, these kinds of mindsets that have isolated the large enterprise off the Internet directly are pushing IPv6 deployments to have the same sort of NAT in, NAT out mentality matching what IPv4 rollouts they have already.</p><p><a title="Redirection to IPv6 by Wikipedia" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NAT66" target="_blank">NAT66</a> has several drafts going through the IETF process now. I was really hoping that we could do away with all the nastiness of NAT and we certainly will in the general deployment for most people. But I fear the driving force behind these large enterprise IT will again make things so convoluted and isolated that we will be dealing with NAT issues for quite some time to come.</p> ]]></content:encoded> <wfw:commentRss>http://blogs.iphouse.net/2012/01/03/nat-the-savior-and-destroyer-of-the-internet/feed/</wfw:commentRss> <slash:comments>0</slash:comments> </item> <item><title>uncomplicated firewall</title><link>http://blogs.iphouse.net/2011/12/02/uncomplicated-firewall/</link> <comments>http://blogs.iphouse.net/2011/12/02/uncomplicated-firewall/#comments</comments> <pubDate>Fri, 02 Dec 2011 17:05:55 +0000</pubDate> <dc:creator>Doug Rau</dc:creator> <category><![CDATA[Online Security]]></category> <category><![CDATA[System Administrators]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Security]]></category><guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.iphouse.net/?p=1504</guid> <description><![CDATA[ufw, or uncomplicated firewall, is the default host firewall tool for Ubuntu and is designed to be easy to use. unless you don&#8217;t realize that its been enabled for you, in which case you&#8217;re likely to spend an hour bashing your head into something trying to get nfs to work. ufw is normally driven from <a href="http://blogs.iphouse.net/2011/12/02/uncomplicated-firewall/" class="more-link">More &#62;</a>]]></description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>ufw, or uncomplicated firewall, is the default host firewall tool for Ubuntu and is designed to be easy to use.</p><p>unless you don&#8217;t realize that its been enabled for you, in which case you&#8217;re likely to spend an hour bashing your head into something trying to get nfs to work. ufw is normally driven from the command line, although a GUI is also available.</p><p>you&#8217;ll need to have root privileges to run ufw.</p><p><span id="more-1504"></span><br /> the command to see whether or not ufw is running is &#8216;ufw status&#8217;. if ufw is not running, you should see&#8230;</p><pre>$ ufw status
Status: inactive</pre><p>if ufw is running, you&#8217;ll see something like this instead&#8230;</p><pre>$ ufw status
Status: active

To                         Action      From
--                         ------      ----
Bind9                      DENY        Anywhere
22                         ALLOW       Anywhere
3306                       DENY        Anywhere
Apache Full                ALLOW       Anywhere</pre><p>here, ufw is active, and is configured to deny or allow specific types of traffic. for example, connections to port 22 (ssh) are allowed from anywhere, whereas connections to port 3306 (mysql) are denied from anywhere. in addition to simple port numbers, ufw can recognize applications, such as &#8216;Apache Full&#8217; (ports 80 and 443/tcp). for more information, see the <em>Application Integration</em> section of the man page.</p><p>the basic command for opening ports is &#8216;ufw allow 161&#8242;. ufw will also refer to the /etc/services file if you specify services by name, &#8216;ufw allow snmp&#8217;. either will allow connections to port 161 (SNMP) from anywhere.</p><p>these examples imply &#8216;from any to any&#8217;, but you can also specify source and host addresses. for example, &#8216;ufw allow from 10.0.0.42 to any port 161&#8242; only allows connections to port 161 from a single address. you can also specify a netblock, such as 10.0.0.0/24. there are additional options, including specifying protocol (tcp or udp) and direction, and limiting or rejecting connections (instead of dropping them); see the man page for these and for more examples.</p><p>also note that rules are processed in order, and the first match wins. more specific rules should come first, followed by more general rules. you can insert a rule into the list using &#8216;ufw insert 2 allow snmp&#8217; (here, into the number 2 slot, moving the current number 2 and following rules down one slot).</p><p>ufw isn&#8217;t a bad thing to have running on your ubuntu host, and is particularly important if its not behind a network firewall. but if you&#8217;re having problems getting a new service running, it&#8217;s probably something worth looking at.</p> ]]></content:encoded> <wfw:commentRss>http://blogs.iphouse.net/2011/12/02/uncomplicated-firewall/feed/</wfw:commentRss> <slash:comments>0</slash:comments> </item> <item><title>Cloud Computing and Sys Admins</title><link>http://blogs.iphouse.net/2009/10/16/cloud-computing-and-sys-admins/</link> <comments>http://blogs.iphouse.net/2009/10/16/cloud-computing-and-sys-admins/#comments</comments> <pubDate>Fri, 16 Oct 2009 15:06:40 +0000</pubDate> <dc:creator>Aileen Horwath</dc:creator> <category><![CDATA[Online Security]]></category> <category><![CDATA[System Administrators]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Virtual Machines]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Security]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Virtualization]]></category><guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.iphouse.net/?p=80</guid> <description><![CDATA[Your company needs a good system administrator looking out for your network and machines.]]></description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>More and more these days I talk to people who are trying to figure out how and whether cloud computing fits into their business model. Cloud computing is really a new version of the old style of mainframe computing where diverse groups share the computing power and storage of large systems. Cloud computing, ideally, will be engineered to minimize or eliminate single points of physical failure. Physical system failure, however, is only one item of many that can affect your system&#8217;s performance and uptime.</p><p>Hardware configurations, including manufacturer choices, operating systems versions and configurations, firewall rules and ongoing maintenance of all the above heavily impact the performance and reliability of your systems.</p><p>Regardless of whether you have computers in your broom closet, colocated at your ISP or deployed in the cloud, your company needs a good system administrator looking out for your network and machines. Good system administrators know the pros, cons and quirks of different hardware, operating systems and network configurations. They know about possible vulnerabilities first because they are on private security lists you don&#8217;t even know exist. They&#8217;ve got your back. George Reese of enStratus, expanded on this in a recent post that compares <a title="Your Cloud Needs a Sys Admin" href="http://broadcast.oreilly.com/2009/10/your-cloud-needs-a-sys-admin.html" target="_self">programmers and sys admins.</a></p><p>One of the big differences between an ipHouse virtual machine (which is essentially deployed in a local cloud) and deploying a server with one of the national cloud providers, is the sys admin expertise that comes with your ipHouse machine. We work with you to make sure the system configuration is optimized for your business applications. We can also administer the machine for you, keeping it securely patched and up-to-date.</p> ]]></content:encoded> <wfw:commentRss>http://blogs.iphouse.net/2009/10/16/cloud-computing-and-sys-admins/feed/</wfw:commentRss> <slash:comments>1</slash:comments> </item> <item><title>Protect me, G-man!</title><link>http://blogs.iphouse.net/2009/05/01/protect-me-g-man/</link> <comments>http://blogs.iphouse.net/2009/05/01/protect-me-g-man/#comments</comments> <pubDate>Fri, 01 May 2009 17:32:08 +0000</pubDate> <dc:creator>Bil MacLeslie</dc:creator> <category><![CDATA[News]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Online Security]]></category> <category><![CDATA[privacy]]></category> <category><![CDATA[taxes]]></category><guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.iphouse.net/?p=55</guid> <description><![CDATA[WHY ON EARTH does the Minnesota Department of Public Safety  think that they should conscript the builders of the Internet (Information Superhighway, get it?) to do their enforcement? ]]></description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div><p>On Monday, April 27, the wise and knowing <a href="http://www.dps.state.mn.us/alcgamb/alcgamb.aspx">Minnesota Department of Public Safety (MDPS),  Alcohol and Gambling Enforcement Division (AGED)</a> delivered written notice to 11 telephone / Internet service providers demanding they &#8220;prohibit access to all Minnesota-based computers to nearly 200 online gambling websites.&#8221;  Here&#8217;s a link to the <a href="http://www.dps.state.mn.us/comm/press/newPRSystem/viewPR.asp?PR_Num=879">press release</a>. </p><p>Ok, this is the Internet we&#8217;re talking about, right?  You know, the Information Superhighway?</p><p>I am guessing that these 11 respectable companies are recognized as Common Carriers by the great state of Minnesota.  That must be the only criteria for being selected for this list, otherwise, we at ipHouse would have received a request too.  Just for the sake of clarity, as of this posting, we have not received a request from the AGED.  But if we had received a request, we would have asked for some kind of legal backing.  And that&#8217;s where this falls down.  The great state of Minnesota is relying on the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Wire_Act">Wire Act of 1961</a> to enforce this ridiculous request.  </p><p>What I can&#8217;t see is how this request can be enforced, even using the Wire Act.  Before I snicker at any enforcement discussion I&#8217;ll put that question aside and just wait and see.</p><p>Now, as a citizen, I understand that the <a href="http://www.dot.state.mn.us/">Minnesota Department of Transportation</a> does not expect the companies who build our roads and bridges to enforce the speed limits on the roads they build.  Further, we would never expect or request these same construction companies to do vehicle contraband inspections at the state border.  So, <strong>WHY ON EARTH </strong>does the Minnesota Department of Public Safety  think that they should conscript the builders of the Internet (Information Superhighway, get it?) to do their enforcement?    Why not go after the people who are committing crimes instead of the people who build the roads?  You don&#8217;t task road builders with catching drunk drivers, do you?</p><p>John Willems is the director of AGED and I can&#8217;t help but wonder  what he was really thinking when he said this:</p><blockquote><p>“In broader context, the long-running debate on online gambling continues to raise significant issues, including absence of policy and regulation, individual rights, societal impact, international fair-trade practices, and funding for criminal and terrorist organizations.”</p></blockquote><p>Does he really think that Joe the Plumber is betting on the Red Sox and innocently funding Al-Qaeda?   Come on.  Isn&#8217;t the whole terrorist thing a little over used? </p><p>I agree that there is a long running debate on gambling in our society.  But it&#8217;s not just online gambling.   To me, the issue of gambling in our society PALES in comparison to some of the other issues Mr. Willems mentions; individual rights and international fair trade practice.  If Minnesota is going to remain competitive in the WORLD, we cannot be xenophobicly locking down our borders to international trade across any of our transit ways, be it by water, air, rail, road or Internet.</p><p>Now, as you look at these various transit ways, all of them EXCEPT the Internet have a specific geographic nexus.  Nearly all transit ways have ports of entry and it&#8217;s easy to see geographic boundaries between nations and states.  It&#8217;s pretty easy to understand the nexus of a shipment of goods coming across the St. Lawrence sea way is the port of entry at Duluth harbor.  It&#8217;s all very black and white.  But the Internet is in as gray area and different because the NEXUS of the transaction is vague.  What is the nexus of a Minnesotan purchasing software from Belgium or India?  What happens when part of the software is written in China?    The nexus of Internet transactions are VAGUE.</p><p>It appears that Mr. Willems has defined the nexus of online gambling is at the individual users computer, right here in Minnesota.  If that&#8217;s right, then Mr. Willems should target the individuals who are committing the crimes.  Why not go to the credit card companies and ask them to report all the transactions between the citizens of Minnesota and these 200 gambling websites?  Because he can&#8217;t afford to.  It&#8217;s easier for him to push on the road builders instead of all the motorists who use the roads.</p><p>We all know that as citizens of Minnesota have REAL problems that need REAL attention.  Like drunk driving and alcohol addiction.  Like air pollution and lung disease.  If Mr. Willems wants to protect the citizens of the great state of Minnesota, maybe he should focus on some of the more pressing problems facing the state.</p><p>I&#8217;m a firm believer in regulating things to protect our society.  Regulating polluters so future generations can enjoy the outdoors seems obvious to me.  Regulating alcohol sales to prevent underage drinking, I&#8217;m all on board.  So why not legalized and regulated online gambling?  It could be a revenue source for the state just like the other areas that Mr. Willems has under his jurisdiction.  Mr. Willems, why not be progressive and start regulating online gambling like you do with bricks and mortar gambling?  </p><p>Whatever the outcome Mr. Willems, just don&#8217;t ask me to collect your revenue for you.  I&#8217;m neither an enforcer nor a tax collector.  I&#8217;m a road builder.  </p><p>Peace.</p><p>-Bil</p></div> ]]></content:encoded> <wfw:commentRss>http://blogs.iphouse.net/2009/05/01/protect-me-g-man/feed/</wfw:commentRss> <slash:comments>0</slash:comments> </item> <item><title>Cookie Monster</title><link>http://blogs.iphouse.net/2009/03/28/cookie-monster/</link> <comments>http://blogs.iphouse.net/2009/03/28/cookie-monster/#comments</comments> <pubDate>Sat, 28 Mar 2009 21:59:46 +0000</pubDate> <dc:creator>admin</dc:creator> <category><![CDATA[Online Security]]></category> <category><![CDATA[cookies]]></category> <category><![CDATA[privacy]]></category><guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.iphouse.net/?p=33</guid> <description><![CDATA[These Cookie Monsters then essentially sell the cookies with targeted information to buyers.]]></description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Cookie Monster sounded better than the title &#8220;What will they think of next.</p><p>Well THEY have thought of a way to track and sell information about you using cookies placed on your computer while shopping.  I have been a privacy hawk when it comes to cookies for a while (more on that below).  As such I was surprised that a  <a title="NY Times article" href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/26/business/media/26adco.htm" target="_blank">NYTimes article</a> was the one to inform me about a newish Internet marketing technique that uses behavioral targeting and cookies across multiple sites.   Read the article quick or you may have to register for their website to read it.   Basically there are companies (the two biggest are eXelate and BlueKai) that work with online merchants to place tracking cookies on your computer and mate them with information about your interests.</p><p>Those interests may be garnered from products you add to a shopping cart, to search terms on those websites, and pages/products you read about on the websites.  These Cookie Monsters then essentially sell the cookies with targeted information to buyers.  I suppose there is an argument that &#8220;you are going to get ads anyways so and might rather look at targeted ads rather than random ones&#8221;.  But what would stop a online store from pairing these &#8220;anonymous preferences&#8221; with your personal information they get from their shopping cart?  I suppose the Cookie Monster&#8217;s terms of service say they can&#8217;t do that, but I am sure it will happen.  After all, <a title="Spamming Antispammers" href="http://blogs.iphouse.net/mike/2009/03/when-anti-spam-companies-spam/" target="_blank">anti-spam companies are now spam-promoting their anti-spam services</a>.</p><p>So, there you go &#8211; yet another thing to worry about.</p><p>If you are paranoid about cookies (like me &#8211; go ahead make fun of me in comments)&#8230;  I use Mozilla Firefox and have privacy preferences set up to block all cookies.   For sites that I trust that require cookies, I add that domain name as an accepted cookie.  Firefox also lets me add these exceptions with a condition that deletes the cookie at the end of the browsing session.  Therefore when I went to <a title="BlueKai's preferences apge" href="http://tags.bluekai.com/registry" target="_blank">BlueKai&#8217;s preferences page</a> to see what info they have about me I got a pleasant message &#8220;We currently do not have anonymous information of your  online preferences.&#8221;</p><p>While we are on the subject&#8230;  Google <a title="Making Ads more interesting?" href="http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2009/03/making-ads-more-interesting.html">recently announced</a> behavioral targetting although they call it &#8220;interest-based&#8221; advertising.   When I read <a title="Google's Ad Privacy Policy" href="http://www.google.com/privacy_ads.html">Google&#8217;s disclosure</a> it just doesn&#8217;t seem as intrusive and open to improper capture of preferences with personal data as these other solutions.  Just in case I&#8217;m drinking the Google Kool-Aid, here are a couple other blogger takes&#8230;</p><ul><li><a title="Transparent Google" href="http://blog.myplaceinthecrowd.org/2009/03/27/transparent-google/">Transparent Google?</a></li><li><a title="Google Watches its Language" href="http://www.mediapost.com/publications/?fa=Articles.showArticle&amp;art_aid=102578">Google Watches its Language</a></li></ul><p>- Eric Snyder</p> ]]></content:encoded> <wfw:commentRss>http://blogs.iphouse.net/2009/03/28/cookie-monster/feed/</wfw:commentRss> <slash:comments>0</slash:comments> </item> <item><title>Ice Phishing</title><link>http://blogs.iphouse.net/2008/12/16/ice-phishing/</link> <comments>http://blogs.iphouse.net/2008/12/16/ice-phishing/#comments</comments> <pubDate>Tue, 16 Dec 2008 19:38:15 +0000</pubDate> <dc:creator>admin</dc:creator> <category><![CDATA[email]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Online Security]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Support]]></category> <category><![CDATA[privacy]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Security]]></category> <category><![CDATA[SPAM]]></category><guid isPermaLink="false">http://iphouse.com/blogs/?p=16</guid> <description><![CDATA[So, how about that minus 20 degrees this morning &#8211; that cold enough for ya? Along with these near record lows last night and this morning, we received reports from a few users about a Phishing Scam that claims to be about their webmail account. This latest version asks the user to respond with their <a href="http://blogs.iphouse.net/2008/12/16/ice-phishing/" class="more-link">More &#62;</a>]]></description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>So, how about that minus 20 degrees this morning &#8211; that cold enough for ya?  Along with these near record lows last night and this morning, we received reports from a few users about a Phishing Scam that claims to be about their webmail account.  This latest version asks the user to respond with their webmail username and password.  This latest round has several give aways that are good reminders of what to look out for with scams in general.</p><p>Phishing is spam that attempts to extract personal information from the recipient.  Here are some quick points about Phishing:</p><p>1. <strong>Email asks for your password</strong>: ipHouse will <em>never ask</em> for your password via email. This is a common policy with many companies so feel free to make it your own policy: Never send a password via email <em>even if</em> you think you know the recipient.</p><p>2. <strong>Strange reply-to address:</strong> The reply-to email address is not an official email address. ipHouse employees and internal addresses are all @iphouse.net. This latest round had the reply-to as an email address in Brazil (.br) or a yahoo.com address.  A general rule for anyone is to always check a provider&#8217;s website for valid contact information. When going to their website type in the address yourself or use an existing valid bookmark. <em>Do not click</em> a link in an email even if it looks valid is it may be a &#8220;masked&#8221; URL whose destination is a different address.</p><p>3. <strong>Credit card  fraud</strong>.  While this email was looking for passwords, many Phishing scams ask for credit card numbers. And for decades there have been phone-based credit card Phishing scams. ipHouse will <em>never ask</em> for your credit card number via email nor ever via a call <em>we initiate</em>. Feel free to make it your own policy with everyone &#8211; never send a credit card number via email and never give your credit card number out to someone unless you initiate the call.</p><p>4. <strong>Spam filters don&#8217;t catch everything</strong>.  While our multiple levels of Antispam catch most Phishing expeditions, some can get through. This one was harder to catch as it didn&#8217;t have any off-site hyperlinks and had enough words that it looked valid to the filters.  We don&#8217;t publish for spammers how we adjust but trust me that we do adjust.  Of course we do want to see what might get through.  For example, <em>yesterday alone</em> ipHouse blocked <abbr title="1463418 was on on 12-15-2008.  Other days vary from 1.3million and 2.4million.">1,463,418</abbr> spam, Phishing, and viruses. We pride ourselves on an extremely low &#8220;<abbr title="A false positive occurs if spam filtering wrongly rejects or quarantines a valid message as spam.">false positive</abbr>&#8221; rate.  If a spam or Phishing message does get through, please forward it with full headers to <a title="spam@iphouse.net" href="mailto:spam@ipHouse.net" target="_blank">spam@ipHouse.net</a>.  If you have an individual question or concern, our <a title="ipHouse Tech Support" href="http://iphouse.com/support.html" target="_blank">Support</a> team can help.</p><p>5.<strong> Learn more!</strong> Here are some links to several sites&#8217; take on Phishing:</p><ul><li>Blogs about Phishing: <a title="PhishingScam" href="http://phishingscam.org/" target="_blank">PhishingScam</a></li><li>Popular OS: <a title="Apple" href="http://support.apple.com/kb/HT2080" target="_blank">Apple</a>, <a title="Protect yourself from Phishing" href="http://www.microsoft.com/protect/yourself/phishing/identify.mspx" target="_blank">Microsoft</a></li><li> Popular Guides (always with a grain of salt please): <a title="Phishing Category" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phishing" target="_blank">WikiPedia </a>, <a title="About.com's Phishing Guide" href="http://antivirus.about.com/od/emailscams/ss/phishing.htm" target="_blank">About</a></li><li>Trade/Industry groups: <a title="Anti-Phishing Work Group" href="http://www.antiphishing.org/" target="_blank">APWG</a>, <a title="National Cyber Security Alliance" href="http://www.staysafeonline.org/" target="_blank">National Cyber Security Alliance</a>, <a title="AARP" href="http://www.aarp.org/money/consumer/online_safety/avoid_phishing_scams/" target="_blank">AARP</a></li><li> Government: <a title="FTC's Stop-Think-Click" href="http://www.onguardonline.gov/topics/phishing.aspx" target="_blank">Stop-Think-Click</a></li></ul><p>- Eric</p> ]]></content:encoded> <wfw:commentRss>http://blogs.iphouse.net/2008/12/16/ice-phishing/feed/</wfw:commentRss> <slash:comments>1</slash:comments> </item> </channel> </rss>
<!-- Performance optimized by W3 Total Cache. Learn more: http://www.w3-edge.com/wordpress-plugins/

Minified using memcached
Page Caching using memcached
Database Caching 1/32 queries in 0.034 seconds using memcached
Object Caching 560/621 objects using memcached

Served from: blogs.iphouse.net @ 2012-02-07 06:47:10 -->
